In this study, a novel binary image authentication scheme is proposed, which can be used to detect any alteration of the host image. In the proposed scheme, the watermark is embedded into a host image using a Hamming-code-based embedding algorithm. A performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme achieves both smaller distortion and lower false negative rates than the previous schemes. key words: image authentication, binary image, fragile watermarking, multimedia security
Introduction
Binary images offer many benefits in various fields such as faxes or digitally-processed signature. However, it can be easily forged during an image communication.
To cope with the problem of binary image forgery in digital media, several image authentication schemes were proposed [1] - [3] , [5] , [8] . Image authentication methods aim to detect any change of a host image by embedding integrity-check code such as watermarks. The previous image authentication schemes, however, have relatively high false negative rates (the probability that the altered image can pass the verification test) [2] , [8] ; or distort a relatively large number of pixels in the host image to embed the watermark [1] , [3] , [5] . This not only degrades the quality of the host image, but also gives an adversary a good chance to detect the presence of the watermarks via statistical tests.
In this letter, a novel authentication scheme for binary images is proposed. In this scheme, n · log 2 ( c/n + 1) -bit watermark can be embedded into the c-bit host image with n blocks by flipping only n pixels. For each block, the Hamming-code-based (HCB) embedding technique [6] , [7] is employed to embed the watermark chunk by flipping only one pixel. Then, a single additional pixel in each block is flipped to conceal the presence of the watermark chunk. To select the position of this flipped pixel, we use all the context of the remaining n − 1 blocks, which significantly reduces the false negative rate of the proposed scheme. Later at the watermark extraction and verification phase, these additionally flipped pixels are recovered to have the original value. The organization of this letter is as follows. A new binary image authentication scheme is proposed in Sect. 2. Performance comparison between the proposed scheme and previous works is provided in Sect. 3. Finally, the conclusion is given in Sect. 4.
Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme consists of the following two algorithms. Given a host image, the Stego-image generation algorithm embeds a watermark to generate the stego-image. From the stego-image, Stego-image verification algorithm can reconstruct the watermark. The validity of the stegoimage can be checked by intactness of the extracted watermark.
Assume that there is a c-bit host image i, which can be divided into n blocks of c/n bits. It is also assumed that the Stego-image generation algorithm and the Stegoimage verification algorithm share a secret key K ∈ {0, 1} t (t is a security parameter), a pseudo-random function f K : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} c/n (K is a seed), and the secure hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} t .
Stego-Image Generation Algorithm
For the c-bit host image i, this algorithm can embed the n · log 2 ( c/n + 1) -bit watermark as follows. First, for each c/n -bit block in i, the HCB watermark embedding algorithm [6] , [7] is employed to embed each log 2 ( c/n + 1) -bit piece of the watermark by flipping one pixel. Detailed description of HCB is in Appendix. Let the produced n intermediate stego-blocks be s 1 , . . . , s n . With these blocks, the watermark concealing algorithm, AuthHide, outputs the final stego-image. the pseudo-random function on the inputs of the shared key K, and the hash value of concatenating all the other blocks. Fig. 1 depicts an overview of the Stego-image generation algorithm. Full description of AuthHide is in Algorithm 1.
Stego-Image Verification Algorithm
For the c-bit stego-image g, this algorithm can extract the n · log 2 ( c/n + 1) -bit watermark as follows. For g with n blocks, the watermark de-concealing algorithm, AuthDeHide, produces the intermediate stego-image blocks s 1 , . . . , s n ; for each block, AuthDeHide flips the pixels that were previously flipped by AuthHide. The procedure of AuthDeHide is exactly the same as AuthHide except the order of the blocks to be processed: the last block that was processed by AuthHide is first processed by AuthDeHide. Fig. 2 shows an overview of the Stego-image verification algorithm. Full description of AuthDeHide is in Algorithm 1.
Then, for each c/n -bit s i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the HCB wa-
. /*update key for the next block*/ end /* AuthDeHide algorithm */ Input: termark extraction algorithm [6] , [7] is employed to extract each log 2 ( c/n + 1) -bit piece of the watermark (full description is in Appendix). Finally, n· log 2 ( c/n +1) -bit watermark can be constructed by concatenating all the pieces together.
Note that for each block g i of the stego-image g, AuthDeHide flips 1 pixel to produce s i and then the extraction algorithm [6] , [7] is employed to extract the piece of the watermark. If the adversary incorrectly guesses the position of the flipped pixel in g i to produce s i ( s i ), the piece of the watermark will be incorrectly extracted. Assume that the adversary (accidentally) produces s i without K. This means that the adversary can also guess the output of the pseudorandom function f without the correct seed, which contradicts the definition of the pseudo-random function because it is assumed to be computationally infeasible to predict the output of the pseudo-random function.
In AuthDeHide, for each g i of the stego-image g, all the other g j s' ( j i) information are related to compute the flipped bit position. Hence, among n blocks, if at least one block g i is modified, all computed s k (1 ≤ k ≤ n) will be different from s k and the extracted watermark is completely crushed.
Performance Analysis
The performance of the proposed scheme is compared with those of [1] - [3] , [5] , [8] . The following two measurement metrics are used.
• False negative rate is a probability that a different (modified) stego-image can pass the verification test.
• Distortion is a required number of flipped pixels to embed the watermark.
Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
First, as for distortion, in the c-bit host image n· log 2 ( c/n + 1) ≈ n log 2 (c/n)-bit watermark can be contained on n-bit distortion: this is because 2n-bit are flipped for stego-image generation and then n-flipped bits are recovered during the stego-image verification. Next, the false negative rate of the proposed scheme is considered. For c-bit binary image, the false negative rate is equal to the rate of the number of binary images (∈ {0, 1} c ) that pass the Stego-image verification algorithm except the original stego-image, in all c-bit binary images (= {0, 1} c ).
For an intermediate stego-block s i ∈ {0, 1}
c/n (1 ≤ i ≤ n) having watermark chunk w i , let the set of the binary images (⊂ {0, 1} c/n ) that have w i be E w i . Then, due to the property of the Hamming code, the cardinality of E w i is 2 c/n − log 2 ( c/n +1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n [7] . Hence, if we consider all n blocks, there are (2 c/n − log 2 ( c/n +1) ) n ≈ (2 c/n−log 2 (c/n) ) n cases that can produce the same watermark chunks (w i s) as the original intermediate stego blocks (s i s). Since the cardinality of {0, 1} c is 2 c , the false negative rate of the proposed scheme (FNR) can be derived as follows:
Note that the additional pixel flipping caused by AuthHide algorithm does not affect FNR because the number of images that can pass the Stego-image verification algorithm, |E w i |, is not affected by AuthHide algorithm; AuthHide is run for each block after all the intermediate stego blocks are generated. AuthHide algorithm aims just to protect the watermark from altering without the correct shared secret key. As mentioned in Sect. 2, it is assumed to be computationally infeasible to guess the position of additionally flipped pixel by AuthHide.
Performance Comparison Result
Comparison results between the proposed scheme and the previous works are summarized at Table 1 . Moreover, Fig. 3 shows comparison of the false negative rate on the same distortion. It is assumed that Kim et al.'s algorithm employs the 1024-bit RSA signature algorithm, the number of flipping pixels is 512 and number of blocks divided is 256. For [4] . §: it is assumed that the k-bit strings that the codeholders select from the host image form a uniform-distribution (where q: # of code holder, k: bit-length of codeword). : The probability that two randomly selected pixels belong to the same block. Because of odd-even encoding, the original watermark chunk can be decoded even if two additional pixels are maliciously flipped in the same block.)
Schemes Distortion False negative rate
Kim et al. [1] , [3] , [5] X/2 † Depends on used cryptographic algorithm ‡ Wu et al. [8] n/2 1/n Proposed scheme n (c/n) −n fair comparison, we also assume that Wu et al.'s scheme does not employ robustness enhancement techniques such as error correcting codes because all the compared schemes are fragile watermarking schemes. Fig. 3 shows that on the same distortion the proposed scheme has far less false negative rates than the other schemes.
Conclusion
In this study, a novel binary image authentication scheme was proposed. According to the analysis and comparison result, the proposed scheme has better performance in terms of distortion and false negative rate than the previous Tzeng et al.'s scheme, Wu et al.'s scheme, and Kim et al.'s scheme.
